THE GOVERNANCE OF FRAGMEGRATION:
NEITHER A WORLD REPUBLIC NOR A GLOBAL INTERSTATE SYSTEM

James N. Rosenau
The George Washington University

So dominant in contemporary consciousness is the assumption that authority must be centralized that scholars are just beginning to grapple with how decentralized authority might be understood... but the question of how to think about a world that is becoming "domesticated" but not centralized, about a world alter "anarchy," is one of the most important questions today facing not only students of international relations but of political theory as well.

In a world where groups and countries are simultaneously fragmenting and integrating, where the two contrary forces are pervasive, interactive, and feed on each other, are the resulting tensions subject to governance? Can mechanisms be developed which steer the tensions in constructive directions? If the deaths of distance, time, and sequentiality are taken seriously, can they serve as stimuli to a renewal of creative thought about what governance may mean in the 21st Century? The first two of these questions serve as the focus of the ensuing analysis, but the answers to them are far from clear. My response to the last question, however, is an unqualified "yes", unqualified in the sense that the transformations at work in the world are so profound that a thoughtful observer cannot but experience a sense of renewal, an impulse to think afresh about how control might be achieved over the contradictions and changes that mark our emergent epoch.

The task is not easy. Our analytic capacities are rooted in methodological territorialism, in a long-standing, virtually unconscious habit of probing problems in a broad, geographic or spatial context. This habit poses an acute problem because of the ever-growing porosity of domestic-foreign boundaries that has rendered territoriality much less pervasive than it used to be even as all the social sciences construct their inquiries, develop their concepts, formulate their hypotheses, and frame their evidence-gathering procedures through spatial lenses. Nor are officials free to think in alternative contexts: as one analyst put it, "Trapped by the territoriality of their power, policy makers in traditional settings often have little choice but to address the symptoms rather than the causes of public problems."
So the task of thinking afresh involves more than sensitivity to profound transformations. It requires breaking out of the conceptual jails in which we have long been ensconced. Elsewhere I have elaborated at length on why we thrive entrapped in these jails and the reasons why it is crucial to break out of them. More than that, in a number of places I have set forth the case for treating our time as an emergent epoch in which the central tensions involve three overlapping polarities – between globalization and localization, centralization and decentralization, and integration and fragmentation – that are marked by continuous interaction between the opposing poles, interactions that are sometimes cooperative, more often conflictual, but at all times ongoing. So as to arrest attention to these tensions, I have coined the term "fragmegration", an awkward and contrived designation that, by combining fragmentation with integration, captures the centrality of the inextricable and endless interaction between the poles for the course of events. To stress this point further I have argue that the emergent epoch is not simply one of globalization, but rather that its complexities are such that it is best thought of as an age of fragmegration.

In the process of working through this perspective I have also identified a number of sources and consequences of fragmegration, while at the same time emphasizing that comprehension of how these several dynamics impact on the processes of fragmegration is highly dependent on developing an understanding of the ways in which individuals at the micro level interact with and shape collectivities at the macro level, and vice versa.

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7 My most extensive probe of these tensions can be found in Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, passim.

8 Other terms suggestive of the contradictory tensions that pull systems toward both coherence and collapse are “chaord”, a label that juxtaposes the dynamics of chaos and order, “glocalization” which points to simultaneity of globalizing and localization dynamics, and “regcal”, a term designed to focus attention on the links between regional and local phenomena. The chaord designation is proposed in Dee W. Heck, *Bird of the Chaordic Age* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1999); the glocalization concept is elaborately developed in Roland Robertson, “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity”, in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), pp.25-44; and the regcal formulation can be found in Susan H.C. Tai and Y.H. Wong, “Advertising Decision Making in Asia: ‘Glocal’ versus ‘Regcal’ Approach”, *Journal of Managerial Issues*, vol.10 (Fall 1998), pp.318-39. Here the term “fragmegration” is preferred because it does not imply a territorial scale and broadens the focus to include tensions at work in organizations as well as those that pervade communities.


Table 1: Some Sources of Fragmegration at Four Levels of Aggregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Aggregation</th>
<th>MICRO</th>
<th>MACRO</th>
<th>MACRO-MACRO</th>
<th>MICRO-MACRO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sources of Fragmegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skill Revolution</td>
<td>expands peoples’ horizons on a global scale; sensitizes them to the relevance of distant events; facilitates a reversion to local concerns</td>
<td>enlarges the capacity of government agencies to think “out of the box”, seize opportunities, and analyze challenges</td>
<td>multiplies quantity and enhances quality of links among states; solidifies their alliances and enmities</td>
<td>constraints policy making through increased capacity of individuals to know when, where and how to engage in collective action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authority Crises</td>
<td>redirect loyalties; encourage individuals to replace traditional criteria of legitimacy with performance criteria</td>
<td>weaken ability of both governments and other organizations to frame and implement policies</td>
<td>enlarge the competence of some IGOs and NGOs; encourage diplomatic wariness in negotiations</td>
<td>facilitate the capacity of publics to press and/or paralyze their governments, the WTO, and other organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bifurcation of Global Structures</td>
<td>adds to role conflicts, divides loyalties, &amp; foments tensions among individuals; orients people toward local spheres of authority</td>
<td>facilitates formation new spheres of authority and consolidation of existing spheres in the multi-centric world</td>
<td>generates institutional arrangements for cooperation on major global issues such as trade, human rights, the environment, etc.</td>
<td>empowers transnational advocacy groups and special interests to pursue influence through diverse channels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Explosion</td>
<td>facilitates multiple identities, subgroupism, and affiliation with transnational networks</td>
<td>increases capacity of opposition groups to form and press for altered policies; divides publics from their elites</td>
<td>renders the global stage ever more transnational and dense with non-governmental actors</td>
<td>contributes to the pluralism and dispersion of authority; heightens the probability of authority crises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobility Upheaval</td>
<td>stimulates imaginations &amp; provides more contacts with foreign cultures; heightens salience of the outsider</td>
<td>enlarges the size &amp; relevance of subcultures, diaporas, and ethnic conflicts as people seek new opportunities abroad</td>
<td>heightens need for international cooperation to control the flow of drugs, money, migrants &amp; terrorists</td>
<td>increases movement across borders that lessens capacity of governments to control national boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microelectronic Technologies</td>
<td>enable like-minded people to be in touch with each other anywhere in the world</td>
<td>empower governments to mobilize support; renders their secrets vulnerable to spying</td>
<td>accelerate diplomatic processes; facilitates electronic surveillance and intelligence work</td>
<td>constrain governments by enabling opposition groups to mobilize more effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakening of Territoriality, States, and Sovereignty</td>
<td>undermines national loyalties and increases distrust of governments and other institutions</td>
<td>adds to the porosity of national boundaries and the difficulty of framing national policies</td>
<td>increases need for interstate cooperation on global issues; lessens control over cascading events</td>
<td>lessens confidence in governments; renders nationwide consensus difficult to achieve and maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization of National Economies</td>
<td>swells ranks of consumers; promotes uniform tastes; heightens concerns for jobs</td>
<td>complicate tasks of state governments vis-à-vis markets; promotes business alliances</td>
<td>intensifies trade and investment conflicts; generates incentives for building global financial institutions</td>
<td>increases efforts to protect local cultures and industries; facilitates vigor of protest movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The rows of Table 1 present the main fragmegrative dynamics as they may operate at the various levels of aggregation represented by the columns. The entries in the cells are crude (and far from inclusive) hypotheses about possible links between the dynamics and individuals (the micro level), collectivities (macro), the interactions of collectivities (macro-macro), and the interactions of individuals and their collectivities (micro-macro). In effect, Table 1 offers a large agenda for research into the emergent epoch and its many tensions.

There is, however, a huge gap in all this theorizing and investigation. I have yet to address the tough questions involved in how governance might be exercised with respect to the dynamics of fragmegration. While I have had several preliminary skirmishes with this challenge, a panel organized around one of the seminal thinkers on global governance serves as a useful stimulus to a direct confrontation with the challenge. Immanuel Kant wrote about governance in a simpler era when the global stage was relatively unpopulated and when the forms of governance were fewer and less complex than is the case today, but he understood that authority was not simply a matter of power, that authority is subject to alteration and dispersal, and that there is a greater chance of "perpetual peace" through the dispersal of authority within and among republics than in the development of a single world republic. It is not my purpose here to assess the probabilities of perpetual peace through the likelihood of a continuing process whereby authority is disaggregated, but Kant's concerns are relevant to the paper's central theme: to make an initial pass at how the relocation of authority may enhance comprehension of global governance in the context of fragmegrative dynamics, recognizing that ideally the governance of fragmegration requires a much more extensive treatment than can be accomplished here.

Given a premise (elaborated below) that authority is undergoing a vast, worldwide process of disaggregation, it goes without saying that the concept of global governance employed here does not refer to the eventual evolution of a world government. As was the case with Kant, such a development is regarded as unrealizable for a host of reasons. Rather, "global governance" is conceived as whatever may be the structures, distribution of authority, and institutions through which the world as a whole at any given time manages its affairs. With a history of wars, tyranny, and pervasive poverty, that management has never come close to being successful. Indeed, with the predominance of an interstate system in recent centuries, a system based on the principle of "anarchy" that treated the sovereignty of states as rendering them immune to alternative authorities, the notion of global governance was not used to characterize the management of world affairs. Instead, the "balance of power" and its variants long constituted the lexicon employed to assess the management of world affairs. It is only with the rapid advance of globalization in recent years, an advance that has shrunk time and distance, increased the porosity of boundaries, and undermined sovereignty and thus the anarchy principle, that the concept of global governance and its potential has become the preoccupation of political theorists, empirical analysts, and public officials, their quest being...
that of designing workable schemes for improving and managing the human condition.\textsuperscript{14} Kant was concerned mainly about war and peace, but the greater complexity of the present period has enlarged the global agenda to include ecological, economic, and cultural issues that are hardly less pressing than those of violent conflict.

Since any effective scheme for global governance will have to take into account the complexity of fragmegrative dynamics, and since such an effort has not – to my knowledge – been previously undertaken, it follows that an initial pass at comprehending the subject can usefully identify possible ways of classifying and conceptualizing the convergence of governance and fragmegration. What follows thus includes two typologies and two conceptual wrinkles that may help future efforts to probe the subject.

\textbf{The Governance of Fragmegration}

It must be stressed at the outset that not every fragmegrative situation on the global agenda lacks governance. If one conceives – as I do – of governance as consisting of rule systems or steering mechanisms that operate in and seek to maintain spheres of authority (SOAs)\textsuperscript{15}, then there are innumerable situations involving localizing responses to globalizing stimuli that are marked by a high, or at least an acceptable, quality of governance and that thus need not be of concern here. As noted below, there has been a vast proliferation of rule systems in recent decades, and many of them are part of a trend to devolve governance so that its steering mechanisms are closer to those who experience its policies. This trend is most conspicuously marked by the evolution of what has been called "multilevel" governance, a form of rule system in which authority is voluntarily and legally disperse among the various levels of community where problems are located and local needs require attention. The European Union exemplifies multilevel governance, as does Scotland, Wales, the French provinces, U.S. welfare programs, and many other federal systems in which previously centralized authority has been redistributed to provincial and municipal rule systems. Such systems are not lacking in tensions and conflicts\textsuperscript{16}, but relatively speaking the quality of governance is such that the tensions do not lead to violence, the loss of life, the deterioration of social cohesion, or the degradation of people. In short, in and of itself no fragmegrative process is inherently negative or destructive.

For all kinds of reasons, however, some fragmegrative situations are fragile, deleterious, violence-prone, and marked by publics who resent, reject, or otherwise resist the intrusion of global values, policies, actors, or institutions into their local affairs. It is these situations that pose the problem of how the governance of fragmegration can be achieved. To be sure, some of the global intrusions can be, depending on one's values, welcomed and


\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, a former vice president of the World Bank, Jean-Michel Severino, has criticized the Bank for its support of policies that shift power from central governments to local authorities. Speaking of countries in Asia and the Pacific, he observed, “My fear is that decentralization will lead to less governance and more corruption spread around the country, disruption of public service and a fiscal burden”. Thomas Crampton, “Corruption on Rise, Asians Are Warned”, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, February 12-13, 2000, p.1.
applauded. The world's intrusion into the apartheid rule system, for example, was clearly worthwhile. But in many cases – in those where fragmegrative situations involve local reactions to globalizing dynamics that result in internal fighting, external aggression, intensified crime, repressed minorities, exacerbated cleavages, sealed boundaries, glorified but exclusionary ideals, pervasive corruption, and a host of other patterns that run counter to human dignity and well being – corrective steering mechanisms that upgrade the quality of governance seem urgently needed. Put more moderately, given the worldwide scope of such situations, effective mechanisms for global governance seem eminently desirable.

Part of the problem of achieving governance over deleterious fragmegrative situations, of course, is that often they require the use of external force against local authorities, a practice that has long been contrary to international law and only lately undergone revision, most notably in Kosovo. But international military interventions into domestic arenas are only one part – and a small one at that – of the challenge of establishing rule systems for unwanted fragmegrative conditions. There are many situations in which organized violence is not the response to globalizing dynamics but which are nonetheless woefully lacking in appropriate steering mechanisms and thus in need of enlightened rule systems. The list of such circumstances is seemingly endless: they can involve situations in which boundaries are sealed, minorities silenced, crime tolerated, majorities deceived, societies ruptured, law flouted, tyrants enhanced, corruption ignored, oppositions jailed, people trafficked, pollution accepted, elections rigged, and thought controlled – to cite only the more conspicuous practices that are protected by the conventions of sovereignty and that one would like to see subjected to a modicum of effective and humane mechanisms of global governance.

Nor are the protections of sovereignty the only hindrance to decent global governance. Governance on a global scale is also difficult because the globalizing and localizing interactions often occur across both cultures and issue areas. For instance, while national governments can address – thought not necessarily alleviate – the fears of their workers over the loss of jobs resulting from foreign trade with relative ease because they have some jurisdiction over both the well being of their workers and the contents of trade legislation, the global scale of fragmegrative dynamics can also involve situations in which the parties to them are not located in the same jurisdiction, with the result that any attempt to steer them must be undertaken by diverse authorities that often have different interests and goals. Indeed, not infrequently a globalizing political or economic stimulus can provoke localizing cultural reactions far removed from the country, region, or issue area in which the stimuli were generated; contrariwise, local events such as protest marches, coups d'état, or severe economic downturns, can have widespread consequences in distant places. The rapid spread of currency crises, for example, often seem ungovernable because authority for coping with the crises is so widely dispersed in this issue area and because much of the action takes place beyond the reach of any extant governments, in cyberspace. Put more strongly, the processes of imitative, emulative, and isomorphic spread, as well as those that are direct and not circuitous, are so pervasive and powerful that developing steering mechanisms that prevent, or at least minimize their unwanted consequences, seems a staggering task under the best of circumstances.

Offsetting the fragmegrative dynamics plaguing global governance are two major underlying and interrelated tendencies that can serve as the basis for thinking afresh about the subject and doing so without being imprisoned by methodological territorialism and the presumption that domestic-foreign boundaries are firm and durable. One concerns the ways in which the dynamics of fragmegration set forth in Table 1 have lessened the capacity of states
to generate compliance on the part of their citizens, to frame decisions, and to pursue goals, all of which spring in part from the advent of horizontal networks that can work around and through the hierarchical structures of states. The second involves a pattern wherein new governments and new forms of governance are proliferating as authority undergoes extensive disaggregation.

The Weakening of States and the Advent of Networks

We are hindered in our understanding of global governance as an alternative to balance-of-power variants by our long-standing habit of treating states as the core from which the diverse collectivities radiate out, like the spokes of a wheel, to exercise authority and conduct their governance activities. States are still among the main players on the global stage, but they are no longer the only main players. Most of them are deep in crisis, by which I do not mean pervasive street riots, but rather crosscutting conflicts that paralyze policy-making processes and result in stalemate and stasis, in the avoidance of decisions that would at least address the challenges posed by a fragmegrative world undergoing vast and continuous changes. Yes, most states still control their banking systems and maintain legitimate monopoly over the use of force. Yes, states have undergone transformation into managerial entities and thereby "retained [their] capacity for surveillance and social control." And yes, the aspiration to statehood is still shared widely in many parts of the world. But for all its continuing authority and legitimacy, key dimensions of the power of the modern state have undergone considerable diminution. In the words of one analyst, "As wealth and power are increasingly generated by private transactions that take place across the borders of states rather than within them, it has become harder to sustain the image of states as the preeminent actors at the global level." More than that, while may still be able to wield social controls within its borders, it no longer possesses the same capacity to control unwanted flows of currency, crime, pollution, drugs, ideas, and (often) people from outside its borders, flows that are relentlessly accelerated and exacerbated by globalization.

No less important, the various fragmegrative dynamics have added to the crises of states by relocating their authority in diverse directions, upward to supranational institutions, downward to subnational entities, and sideward to social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and a wide range of other types of collectivities. To be sure, and as previously noted, some of the relocation of authority has been purposely mandated and encouraged by central governments. In many instances, however, the weakened capacity of states has combined with the skill revolution, organizational explosion, and mobility upheaval cited in Table 1 to generate, so to speak, vacuums of authority into which other collectivities have moved.

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17 Some analysts suggest that conceptions of the state trace a pendulum-like pattern that swings back and forth between notions of strong and weak states. See for example, Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization”, World Politics, vol.50, October 1997, p.83, who cites Dani Rodrik as observing that “excessive optimism about what the state would be able to accomplish was replaced by excessive pessimism”.


It follows that politics and governance need to be understood as social processes that transcend state and societal boundaries so thoroughly as to necessitate a reinvention of the wheel. What is needed is a conveyance with many wheels that sometimes roll harmoniously in the same direction, that sometimes move crazily in contradictory directions, and that often lurch fitfully as some wheels turn while others are stationary.

This is a metaphoric way of again asserting the need to rethink the various rule systems and processes through which authority is exercised across the conventional boundaries of countries. More than that, as the differences, overlaps, and contradictions that mark collectivities on the global stage have become ever more pervasive, rethinking is needed that allows for the possibility of new terminal entities emerging that serve as the focus of the most salient loyalties and affiliations of groups and individuals in the same ways states have. We need, in other words, to differentiate among the diverse collectivities in terms of the structures and processes that sustain them. An acceleration of the diffusion of authority within and beyond states and the advent of network forms of organization have generated dynamics that configure the emergent system of global governance and thus can usefully serve as the basis of fresh formulations.

While Table 1 reminds us there are a number of dynamics that have contributed to the diminution of state capacities, certainly one of the most important of these has been the shirting balance between hierarchical and network forms of organization, between vertical flows of authority and horizontal flows. Greatly facilitated by the Internet, people now converge electronically as equals, or at least not as superiors and subordinates. They make plans, recruit members, mobilize support, raise money, debate issues, frame agendas, and undertake collective action that amount to steering mechanisms founded on horizontal rather than hierarchical channels of authority. Indeed, it has been argued, with reason, that

The rise of network forms of organization – particularly "all channel networks" in which every node can communicate with every other node – is one of the single most important effects of the information revolution for all realms: political, economic, social, and military. It means that power is migrating to small, nonstate actors who can organize into sprawling networks more readily than can traditionally hierarchical nation-state actors. It means that conflicts will increasingly be waged by "networks," rather than by "hierarchies." It means that whoever masters the network form stands to gain major advantages in the new epoch. Some actors, such as various terrorists and criminals, may have little difficulty forming highly networked, largely nonhierarchical organizations; but for other actors, such as professional militaries that must continue to uphold hierarchies at their core, the challenge will be to discover how to combine hierarchical and networked designs to increase their agility and flexibility for field operations.\(^{20}\)

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In other words, not only has the advent of network forms of organization undermined the authority of states, but in the context of our concern with the governance of fragmegration it has also had even more important consequences. Most notably, the networks have contributed to the disaggregation of authority as well as the formation of new collectivities not founded on hierarchical principles. Indeed, “[n]etworks are the analytic heart of the notion of governance in the study of Public Administration”\textsuperscript{21}.

If this notion that new rule systems can be founded on horizontal rather than vertical structures of authority seems awkward at best and absurd at worst, as the epigraph set forth at the outset indicates is likely, the way to grasp such a possibility is to appreciate that the core of effective authority lies in the compliance of those toward whom it is directed. If people ignore, avoid, or otherwise do not heed the compliance sought by "the" authorities, then it can be said that for all practical purposes the latter are authorities in name only, that their authority has evaporated. Authority, in other words, is profoundly relational. It links – or fails to do so, or does somewhat – those who issue directives and those for whom the directives are intended. Stated more elaborately, authority needs to be treated as a continuum wherein at one extreme full compliance is evoked and at the other extreme it is not. The viability of all collectivities can be assessed by ascertaining where they are located on the continuum. The closer they are to the compliance extreme, the greater will be their viability and effectiveness, just as the nearer they are to the noncompliance extreme the greater is the likelihood that they will be ineffective and falter. Thus it becomes possible to conceive of collectivities held together through horizontal flows of authority – through compliance with electronic messages cast as requests rather than as directives – and it is precisely this possibility that underlies the bifurcation of global structures into state- and multi-centric worlds (identified in the third row of Table 1), the disaggregation of authority, the growing relevance of NGOs and other networked organizations, and the increased attention paid to the possibility that a global civil society may be emerging.

The Proliferation of Governance and the Relocation of Authority

There is no lack of either variety or number in the extant systems of governance. On the contrary, it is difficult to underestimate how crowded the global stage has become as the world undergoes a proliferation of all kinds of governance, from formal to multilevel governments, from formally sanctioned entities such as truth commissions to informal SOAs, from emergent supranational entities such as the European Union to emergent issue regimes, from regional bodies to international governmental organizations (IGOs), from transnational corporations to neighborhood associations, from humanitarian groups to ad hoc coalitions, from certifying boards to social movements, and so on across an ever-widening array of activities and concerns.

Nor is it possible to overstate the organizational explosion noted in the fourth row of Table 1. At every level of community new organizations, both voluntary and for profit, are coming into being at such a rapid rate that precise tabulations of them is, for various reasons,

impossible\textsuperscript{22}. One set of statistics, however, conveys the scope of the explosion: while Indonesia had only one independent environmental organization twenty years ago, now there are more than 2,000 linked to an environmental network based in Jakarta; registered nonprofit organizations in the Philippines grew from 18,000 to 58,000 between 1989 and 1996; in Slovakia the figure went from a handful in the 1980s to more than 10,000 today; and in the U.S. 70 percent of the nonprofit organizations—not counting religious groups and private foundations—filing tax returns with the Treasury Department are less than 30 years old and a third are less than 15 years old\textsuperscript{23}.

For purposes of emphasis, moreover, it is useful to reiterate that the organizational explosion is not confined to nongovernmental organizations. Not only have new forms of government been developed, but also old ones have added new layers and transferred their authority either downward to subnational levels or upward to supranational levels.

In short, with the collapse of time and distance in an increasingly complex and interdependent world, the global stage is ever more dense with diverse collectivities that have steering mechanisms and rule systems for exercising authority and that, viewed as a whole, amount to a vast system of global governance. Whether this greater density has enhanced or hampered the system's effectiveness is a question to which we shall return.

The Governance Ladder

This vast proliferation of rule systems calls for a sorting out, for typological clarification. While the great number and variety of governance entities suggests parsimonious classification may be unachievable, two schemes do seem immediately plausible. One is based on the movement of issues and the other focuses on the structures and processes that sustain the flows of authority. In the case of the former, what has been called a "governance ladder" traces the movement of issues up and down the various rungs as they arrest the attention of officials and publics, thereby becoming governance issues. Issues that first generate widespread awareness at local levels get onto the ladder at the bottom rungs, while those that originate at the global level occupy the top rungs, just as those that get onto political agendas at the national level perch on the middle rungs. Some issues remain on the same rung throughout; some start at the bottom and move to the top; and some start at the top and percolate down. Such a scheme has been cogently framed with reference to environmental issues:

If climate change has been introduced so-to-speak at a global level and is slowly moving down the governance ladder, biodiversity, on the other hand… has mainly been introduced at a national level and is currently both moving upwards and downwards. Water… is clearly characterized by a bottom-up approach: awareness that it constitutes a governance issue has emerged first at a local level, tied as it is to livelihoods, and is currently moving to the national and the global

\textsuperscript{22} For a discussion of some of the difficulties involved in tracing and classifying their proliferation, see James N. Rosenau, \textit{Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.408.

levels. We propose here to use the term of comprehensive governance in order to account for the fact that governance occurs at all levels (from local to global), involves all stakeholders, and links at least the three issues together, i.e., water, biodiversity, and climate change.

In sum, an ever-expanding realm in which governance is undertaken and implemented marks the age of fragmentiation. In the future, it seems clear, multilevel or comprehensive governance will be the dominant modes through which NGOs, communities, governments, regions, and the world attempt to exert a modicum of control over their affairs. Needless to say, enormous implications follow from this trend for the loyalties of people and the location and dispersion of the authorities to whom they are responsive and who evoke their compliance. Elsewhere I have suggested that the dynamics of fragmentiation have generated new identities, which in turn involve and often require multiple loyalties, if not a shift in the collectivities regarded as most salient and terminal.

A Six-Governance Typology

However, while the proliferation of the number and variety of rule systems active in the emergent epoch makes it easier to break with the state-centric model and think afresh about managing the fragmentative dynamics that mark the global scene, once the break is made the governance ladder may not be sufficient. A somewhat more elaborate typology may be required if account is to be taken of the diversity, the horizontality, and the sheer number of steering mechanisms that now crowd the global stage. A possibility here is the aforementioned focus on the structures and processes that sustain the flows of authority. For analytic purposes such a focus points to six general forms of global governance. Three of these reflect the complex and extensive nonlinear feedback processes that have accompanied the advent of fragmentiation: one can be called “network” governance, another labeled “side-by-side” governance, and still another designated as “web-like” governance. These three can, in turn, be distinguished from three other, more straightforward forms that are less complex and more linear and familiar sources of governance: those that can be traced so fully to the cajoling, shaming, noisy pressures, or other activities of NGOs and transnational advocacy groups that the governments of states are, in effect, mere policy ratifiers at the receiving end of the flow of authority (the governance-without-government or bottom-up model), those that derive from the downward flow of authority originating within corporations or among national states and their bureaucracies (the governance-by-government or top-down model), and those that stem from the informal horizontal flows whereby economic exchanges in the framework of formal regulatory mechanisms (the governance-by-market model).


26 “Networking can be defined as a set of organizational arrangements midway between horizontal coordination (markets) and vertical coordination (hierarchies)”. Thomas J. Courchene, “Celebrating Flexibility: An Interpretive Essay on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism” (Montreal: C.D. Howe Institute, October 16, 1995), p.29.
These six forms of governance come more fully into focus if a key structural attribute of the global governance system (the degree to which authority is formally established) and a key process attribute (the degree to which authority flows in vertical or horizontal directions) serve as analytic bases for classifying the various collectivities active on the global stage. More precisely, the structural attribute can usefully be trichotomized, with governance arrangements consisting of (1a) formal, (1b) informal, or (1c) both formal and informal (mixed) structures, while the process attribute can be dichotomized in terms of whether authority flows in a (2a) single direction (up or down) or (2b) multiple directions (both up and down as well as back and forth horizontally). The resulting 3x2 matrix (see Table 2) serves to distinguish the six forms of global governance.

One virtue of this classificatory framework is that it allows for seemingly similar types of collectivities to be analyzed differently to the extent their structures and processes vary. Indeed, as can be seen in the matrix, if the numerous and diverse collectivities involved in global governance are reduced to seven basic types, each type can engage in more than one form of governance if different situations evoke their participation and authority in different ways. Global governance is much too convoluted, in other words, for there to be a perfect fit between the seven forms of governance and the six types of collectivities.

Before differentiating more fully among the forms of governance, let us specify the six types of collectivities that crowd the global stage. These consist of (1) public subnational and national governments founded on hierarchical structures formally adopted in constitutions; (2) for-profit private transnational corporations (TNCs) formally and hierarchically structured by articles of incorporation; (3) international governmental organizations (IGOs) based on formal treaties and charters; (4) subnational and national not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sustained by either formal by-laws or informal, undocumented arrangements; (5) international or transnational not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) either formally structured as organizations or informally linked together as associations or social movements; and (6) markets that have both formal and informal structures which steer horizontal exchanges between buyers and sellers, producers and consumers. In addition to the variety introduced by the degree of formal or informal organization, these diverse collective actors also vary in the nature of their composition, with the distinction used here involving those comprised of elites, mass publics, or both elites and masses.

### Table 2: Six Types of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Collectivities Involved in This Form of Governance</th>
<th>PROCESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(vertical or horizontal)</td>
<td>unidirectional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-Down Governance</td>
<td>(states, TNCs, IGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-Up Governance</td>
<td>(mass publics, NGOs, INGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S</strong> formal</td>
<td><strong>T</strong> informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> informal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike top-down, bottom-up, and market governance, the other three forms are not marked by processes that flow in essentially one direction. The fourth form (the governance-by-network model) involves bargaining among equal (i.e., nonhierarchical), formally organized collectivities – between governments, within business alliances, or between NGOs and INGOs – that ensues when the impetus for governance stems from common interests in particular problems. The fifth form (the side-by-side model) arises not out of the noisy pressures, internal deliberations, or horizontal bargaining that respectively mark bottom-up, top-down, or network governance, but out of cooperative interchanges among transnational nongovernmental elites and state officials, interchanges that are so thorough and effective that the distinction between formal and informal inputs breaks down and the two become fully intertwined and indistinguishable. The sixth form (the mobius-web model) occurs when the impetus to steer a course of events derives from networked interactions across levels of aggregation among TNCs, INGOs, NGOs, IGOs, states, elites and mass publics, interactions that are so intricate as to constitute a hybrid structure in which the dynamics of governance are so overlapping among the several levels as to form a singular, web-like process that neither begins nor culminates at any level or at any point in time.

It is important to reiterate that all six models involve governance and government on a transnational or global scale. One cannot rely upon the literature on state-society relationships to distinguish these models, since this literature focuses on national rather than global governance and does not allow for transnational processes and structures of governance that transcend societal and state boundaries. National and subnational actors may be participants in any or all of the six processes, but their participation stems from concerns over developments beyond their subnational or national jurisdictions.

It should also be stressed that while the labels used to designate the different forms of governance are descriptive of hierarchy or its absence, they do not preclude occasional fluctuations and reversals in the patterns of interaction. In other words, the labels are shorthand ways of referring to central tendencies, to the nature and essential direction of the paths along which authority and the impetus for governance flows. But they also allow for nuance. Top-down governance, for example, originates mainly within the halls of state governments, but corporations that dominate an industry can also initiate it. The campaign to get Yugoslavia to desist from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is illustrative in this regard. Both during its diplomatic and military phases, the campaign was sustained exclusively by governments. To be sure, NATO's efforts were energized and supported by public shock over the scenes of cleansing depicted by the television media, but the origins and impetus for governance in that situation can be traced readily to the authority exercised by governments. On the other hand, bottom-up governance refers to policies that may be ratified by governments but that are propelled and unfold mainly outside the halls of governments. The processes in which governments eventually yielded to pressures from NGOs to approve a land-mine treaty are a quintessential example of bottom-up governance. The setting of standards for commodities and productive processes is no less a quintessential example of bottom-up governance. Thousands of standards were authorized for thousands of commodities and productive processes by autonomous and nongovernmental organizations well before
quasi-
state bodies became involved in monitoring and implementing the standards. In contrast to the types of governance that flow vertically either up or down, the network, side-by-side, and mobius-web forms of governance are pervaded with nuance, by interactive and multiple flows of influence that may either pass through or by-pass the halls of government and thus are too complex and overlapping to justify an essentially unidirectional presumption.

It is hardly surprising that our newly invented wheel consists of five different forms of global governance. Just as states vary substantially in the structures and processes through which they govern, so has variety evolved at the global level as the tasks of governance have moved ever more fully beyond the territorial boundaries of states. In other words, the existence of six discernible and meaningful forms of global governance speaks to the continuing expansion of complexity in world politics. If the statics of continuity rather than the dynamics of transformation prevailed today, it would be unnecessary to enlarge our analytic antennae beyond the long-standing conceptions in which the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs are firmly in place and top-down and bottom-up governance serve as the prime means for framing and implementing policies both at home and abroad. As stressed throughout, however, such conceptions are no longer sufficient. More often than not, the global stage is witness to situations unfolding in ways that call for supplementing linear models with models rooted in nonlinear feedback and network processes.

The nonlinearity of simple-network, side-by-side and complex-web governance derives from the nature of the issues that each, respectively, undertakes to resolve. In the first case, network governance occurs when interactions exclusively among formal actors such as states or business alliances take place and feedback loops form for common problems to be resolved. In the second case, side-by-side governance emerges and is sustained in issue areas where the loci of action are so widely dispersed, unrelated, and situation-specific that neither the relevant governmental officials nor their nongovernmental counterparts can usefully resort to mass mobilization and, instead, must rely on nonconfrontational cooperation to achieve control over the diverse and unrelated situations. The global effort to combat corruption is a classic example in this regard. The major INGO devoted to waging this fight, Transparency International (TI), has self-consciously avoided provoking mass publics and confined its efforts to working closely with the officials of both states and IGOs in the hope of persuading them to adopt anti-corruption policies. The eight years of TI's short life has witnessed the World Bank, the OECD, the IMF, several regional IGOs, and many states formally explicate goals and strategies for reducing corrupt practices within their realms of authority. It is virtually impossible to determine how much of this correlation between TI's nonconfrontational methods and the actions of the various governing bodies are due to the former's efforts, but that of course is the nature of nonlinear feedback processes. Students of global governance have little choice other than inferring from the available evidence whether it is reasonable to conclude that TI's contribution was significant. All they can do is assess the elite interaction across the private-public divide and trace whether the correspondence between the rapid spread of norms against corruption expressed through statements and

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formal resolutions of IGOs and states derives, at least in part, from the contacts and interactions that IT established with those agencies undertaking the policy initiatives.

In a sense mobius-web governance would seem to amount to a vast elaboration of side-by-side governance. The major difference involves resort to mass mobilization. As noted, such processes are unlikely to occur in side-by-side governance. In the case of mobius-web governance, however, the relevant actors are closely linked and neither widely dispersed nor situation-specific, with the result that the relevant agencies are prone to cross the private-public divide by mobilizing mass publics as well as elites on behalf of the values at stake. The environmental issue area is illustrative. It encompasses intricate networks of actors at subnational, national, transnational, and international levels who interact in such diverse ways as to render fruitless any attempt to tease out the direction of causal processes. That is, IGOs and most states have yielded to the pressures of NGOs and INGOs on issues pertaining to the environment and cooperatively formed both formal and informal networks through which the spreading norms get translated into mechanisms of governance. Indeed, mobius-web governance may be marked by a cumulative sequencing in which the pressures generated by bottom-up governance give rise to top-down and side-by-side governance that, in turn, becomes a vast network encompassing all levels of governance and diverse flows of authority. On the other hand, one analyst estimates that in the course of these complex sequences the governance of issues will become more formalized under IGOs and states, thereby "eating into the realms of the INGOs/NGOs".

Admittedly this six-governance typology is complicated and not lacking in overlaps among the types. Given the diversity of new forms of horizontal governance, however, the typology helps bring a modicum of order to the subject even as it highlights the complexity of our fragmegrative epoch.

Three Rule Systems

In addition to these typologies, two conceptual wrinkles might be developed to probe further the governability of deleterious fragmegrative dynamics. One differentiates among economic, political, and idea (or normative rule systems and the other involves a key property of any ride system. The three basic clusters of steering mechanisms can each be viewed as a self-contained system that may or may not overlap with the other two. Each relies on one or another variant of an essential means for exercising its authority. One of the three is the regulatory system. Its ultimate steering mechanism is coercion, with bargaining, threatening, or other control mechanisms in the political realm being preferred variants. The second is the market system. Using variants such as monetary incentives and fiscal supervision, it relies on exchange as its primary means of managing authority in the economic realm. The third is the idea system, which employs norms as its means of implementing authority, with childhood socialization and adult learning being among its variants. In short, all three systems embrace a wide variety of steering mechanisms and all three are marked, to different degrees, by format and informal institutions designed to employ authority as a means

29 David John Frank, Ann Hironaka, John W. Meyer, Evan Schofer, and Nancy Brandon Tuma, “The Rationalization and Organization of Nature in World Culture”, in Boli and Thomas (eds.), Constructing World Culture, chap.3.

30 John Boli, personal correspondence, April 30, 1999.
of generating the compliance of the collectivities or persons who fall within their purview. More specifically, diverse local, provincial, national, and supranational governments, along with even more diverse SOAs such as informal bureaucratic or nongovernmental agencies, operate as steering mechanisms for regulatory systems, just as various corporations, industries, stock exchanges, international organizations, and other financial instruments act authoritatively in market systems and just as a wide range of idea systems, such as those that focus on democracy, human rights, and environmental issues, are endowed with varying degrees of authority insofar as collectivities and publics in different parts of the world are concerned.

As previously noted, the challenge of governing fragmegration does not involve every, or even most, situations where fragmegrative dynamics are operative. The challenge only pertains to those circumstances that are unacceptable from the perspective of concerned observers who care about promoting a world that is at the same time liberal, democratic, and orderly. The fragmenting of some regulatory, market, and idea systems can be welcomed, either because they bring the governance of communities closer to the people involved or because the larger system undergoing fragmentation is deleterious from a value perspective. The fragmentation of the USSR was welcome to those who value democracy as a basis for organizing the political life of communities, albeit Russia's subsequent ten years were marked by market and idea systems that proved to be weak as mechanisms for exercising authority.

Much the same can be said about the integration of regulatory, market, and idea systems. Some rule systems can prosper as they integrate and others may suffer horrendous consequences. The European Union and the Congo exemplify, respectively, such outcomes. Some market systems benefit through integration and some may undergo deterioration, depending on the economic philosophy of those making such judgments. Many analysts in the current milieu, for instance, would argue that the steering mechanisms of the W.T.O, the IMF, and the World Bank are beneficial for the global market, its trading and investment practices, because they offer long-run, wealth-creating benefits for both societies and individuals. Others would point to developments like the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s as evidence of the detrimental consequences for societies and individuals that can flow from a free enterprise system and as indicators of the potential for fragmegration in the economic realm. Likewise, the integration of some idea systems can serve liberal democratic values even as others can undergo deleterious outcomes as they integrate. The spread of inclusive human rights norms and of exclusive religious fundamentalism are illustrative, respectively, of these patterns.

It follows that the main challenge fragmegration poses for steering mechanisms in the political realm concerns those fragmenting or integrating collectivities that rule on the basis of authoritarian principles and that stress exclusivity and oppose the presence of minorities. Likewise, the fragmentation or integration of market systems can be challenging if jobs are threatened and the access of consumers is constricted through conglomerates and mergers that conduce to higher prices. Much the same can be said about idea systems: if the fragmentation of democratic ideals lead to the dispersal of democratic practices in the context of different cultures and societies, then the concern about the governance of fragmegration is less than would be the case if the fragmentation led to NGOs that lacked transparency or SOAs that held rigged elections.

Still, troubling questions remain: if governance consists of steering mechanisms that enable collectivities, be they states or other types of SOAs, to maintain themselves and move
toward whatever may be their goals, can the mechanisms be tailored to cope with an ameliorate those fragmegrative dynamics that do not promote liberal and democratic commitments in rule, market, and idea systems? Irrespective of the dynamics that lead to positive outcomes, are there mechanisms for exerting a modicum of control over the many that are essentially negative and undermine the cohesion of communities, the integrity of markets, and the norms of decent idea systems at any or all levels? Can civil society develop the appropriate steering mechanisms? Is it sufficient to rely on the proliferation of SOAs, or are there additional steering mechanisms that can supplement those emerging out of the processes of disaggregation? If so, are they likely to evolve on their own or can public policies nurse them into being as leaders and publics become increasingly concerned about the diverse challenges that threaten the global system? Quite apart from whether they evolve or are nursed, can a wide array of steering mechanisms be brought under an overall umbrella, or must each challenge be addressed by a separate mechanism with minimal negative consequences for the evolution of others? Will the acceleration of the skill revolution be sufficient to facilitate the adoption of innovative and imaginative steering mechanisms that can effectively address the noxious forms of fragmentation? Or must responses to such queries await solution of the methodological obstacles inherent in any effort to comprehend nonlinear processes?

The last question is the easiest to answer. Even in the absence of adequate methodologies, the other questions are too important to ignore on the grounds of insufficient knowledge. One must forge ahead in the hope of sustaining a dialogue on global governance that may eventually prove innovative and imaginative, thereby yielding insights into ways in which the governance of fragmegration can be developed.

Hard to puzzle through as the other questions are, a context for probing them requires recognizing that the governance of fragmegrative dynamics is perhaps the most difficult of all the challenges that face those who undertake to steer the course of their collectivities. The difficulties are rooted in the nature of either the fragmenting forces that lead groups to resist the integrating forces they feel impinge on their well being or the integrating forces that foster a sense of exclusion on the part of people and collectivities left out of the integrative process. The resistances tend to be deeply rooted in one or another kind of commitment to local practices, habits, and traditions, while resentments over exclusion tend to derive from aspirations for a better standard of living and other perquisites that may flow from integration.

Hence both the resistant and resentful groups are not readily amenable to the directives that stem from the hierarchical authority that initiate and sustain the integration or fragmentation of collectivities. It follows, as has already been stressed, that the governance of fragmegration is highly dependent on authority that is dispersed and decentralized, that flows less vertically and more horizontally through participatory channels. Recent conflicts in Chechnya and the U.S. War are extreme examples of how steering mechanisms founded on vertical authority do not result in effective governance, whereas the developments that have progressively strengthened the European Union are illustrative of how various forms of horizontal authority can overcome, or at least minimize, resistances to integration.

**Systems and Subsystems as Steering Mechanisms**

The second conceptual wrinkle that can help clarify the governability of deleterious fragmegrative dynamics involves assessing political, economic, and normative steering
mechanisms in terms of their relative strength as systems and subsystems. Some of the mechanisms are subsystem-dominant systems and others are system-dominant systems, with the difference being that in the former case the structure of the system is vulnerable to alteration by one or more of its subsystems, whereas in the latter case no subsystem can, on its own, alter the system's structure. In the case of market systems, for example, the wheat market is system dominant and the automobile market is subsystem dominant: no wheat farmer can alter the market, but an automobile producer can through new models or technological innovations. In the case of idea systems, the democratic subsystem is more system dominant than the human rights subsystem in the sense that the norm of adhering to certain democratic procedures is stronger than is the one that attaches to human rights. Likewise, authoritarian governments are system-dominant regulatory systems while, say, federal systems are subsystem-dominant regulatory systems.

Within-System Interdependencies

Whatever the multiplicity of SOAs that evolve in the future, each of them will be embedded in a larger system of aggregation and each is likely to encompass a variety of subsystems. Such is the nature of any system: it maintains its coherence through shared values and practices that enable its subsystems to survive and prosper even as it shares some of the values of the more encompassing systems of which it is a part. The central problem of the negative forms of fragmegration is that either subsystems seek to preserve their coherence by contesting the values and practices of the larger systems of which they are, either informally or legally, a long-standing component, or the more encompassing systems are intolerant of the unique values and practices of their deviant subsystems. Systemic prosperity and survival, in other words, is posited as a zero-sum game by both the more encompassing systems and their subsystems. It follows that a major task, perhaps the major task, of leadership at any systemic level is to employ mechanisms of governance that allow for an appreciation of nonzero-sum solutions to any differences that may come between regulatory, market, or idea systems and their subsystems. In short, effective global governance involves policies that promote diversity within unity, that enable SOAs to encourage their members to develop skills for discerning system-subsystem interdependencies and means for avoiding their destructive consequences.

Idealistic? Perhaps, but history records more than a few cases of leaders of regulatory systems who could have prevailed over opposing subsystems upon taking over the reins of power but chose instead to raise their sights and work on behalf of their whole systems. Even more telling, there are abundant cases of regulatory systems with multiple levels of governance that have managed to sustain themselves, maintain coherence through nonzero-sum mechanisms of cooperation and, indeed, enjoy progress at both system and subsystem levels.

Some would argue that the historical record is less encouraging insofar as market systems are concerned. Efforts to establish globally shared rules and norms that will serve to manage the flows of foreign direct investment have foundered. Investors can still withdraw their funds from developing markets suddenly and bring about the kind of financial crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997. Likewise, it is ever more possible for a single individual to

bring about the collapse of e-mail systems around the world (as happened with the I LOVE YOU virus in May 2000) or to cause the bankruptcy of a bank (as Nick Leeson did to the Barings bank in 1995). Such events, however, appear to have alerted those who sustain market systems of the ever-present dangers inherent in a global economy. Both at the systemic level of countries seeking to establish an international investment regime and at the subsystemic level of e-mail systems and banks adopting surveillance rules to protect their procedures signs are manifest of efforts to develop steering mechanisms that can prevent a recurrence of such fragmegrative dynamics.

In the case of idea systems, history seems clearly on the positive side of fragmegration. There are exceptions, of course, but the general trend is in the direction of norms relative to the dignity of individuals and the well being of groups being increasingly integrated. Different parts of the world may differ over the meaning of democracy and human rights, but everywhere both democratic and human rights are valued and asserted, however differently they may be defined and practiced. Ideas revolving around the environment and development are less consensual and thus comprise an idea system more vulnerable to fragmegration, with those who would protect the environment and those who want to develop its resources often at loggerheads, but even here a growing sensitivity to the virtues of environmentalism can be discerned at every level of community.

Across-System Interdependencies

While regulatory, market, and idea systems thus seem potentially capable of coping with numerous and varied fragmenting processes originating within their own subsystems, some of the most difficult fragmegrative situations arise when those who preside over a steering mechanism in one of the three realms resists, resents, deviates, or are otherwise negatively responsive to the operation of mechanisms in one of the other two systems. Such across-system interdependences are, obviously, much more likely to appear as zero-sum situations than is the case for their within-system counterparts. The resistance of China to the implementation of the human rights idea system by the U.N. regulatory system is illustrative of the overlap of unalike steering systems. So were the reactions in the streets of Indonesia to the manner in which the IMF sought to steer the market system during the 1997-98 financial crises in Asia.

There are no clear-cut avenues along which solutions to fragmegrative situations rooted in across-system interdependencies can be developed. Conflicts that may undermine within-system interdependencies and initiate fragmegrative processes are at least amenable to appeals that they involve subsystems of the same system. The members of such subsystems know they share a history, economy, traditions, or aspirations that could, given the appropriate circumstances and leadership, allow for the evolution of nonzero-sum solutions to their conflicts. Not so for those caught up in fragmegrative situations that span systems in different jurisdictions. They may well have difficulty envisioning nonzero-sum solutions and, indeed, it is here where the challenge of global governance is most severe and where the adaptive challenges are most acute. And it may also be that it is here where civil society and the wide array of horizontal interactions among NGOs and other types of SOAs can play a role as intermediaries, leading the parties who sustain the negative sides of fragmegration to come to appreciate the virtues of redefining zero-sum situations into ones from which all can derive benefits.
**Conclusions**

Of course, typologies and conceptual wrinkles are only aides to organizing thought. They do not in any way come close to answering the questions which this paper addresses as a conclusion: will the weakening of states, the proliferation of rule systems, the disaggregation of authority, and the greater density of the global stage enhance or diminish the effectiveness of the overall system of global governance? While there will doubtless be pockets of ineffectiveness and breakdown, will the emergent system, on balance, make for more humane and sensitive governance? Are the tensions and conflicts fostered by the deleterious aspects of fragmegration likely to prove ungovernable?

Upbeat answers strike me as plausible if one is willing to look beyond the immediate present. In the first place, more than a little truth attaches to the aphorism that there is safety in numbers. That is, the more crowded the global stage gets with steering mechanisms, the less can any one of them, or any coalition of them, dominate the course of events and the more will all of them have to be sensitive to how sheer numbers limit their influence. Every rule system, in other words, will be hemmed in by all the others, thus conducing to a growing awareness of the virtues of cooperation and the need to contain the worst effects of deleterious fragmegration.

Secondly, there is a consciousness of and intelligence about the processes of globalization at is spreading widely to every corner of the earth. What I call "the globalization of globalization" 32 is accelerating at an extraordinary rate – from the halls of academe and government to the conference rooms of corporations to the peasant homes of China (where the impact of the WTO is an intense preoccupation) people in all walks of life have begun to appreciate their interdependence with others as time and distance shrink. For some, maybe even many, the rush into a globalized world may be regrettable, but few are unaware that they live in a time of change and thus there is likely to be a growing understanding of the necessity to confront the challenges of fragmegration and of being open to new ways of meeting them. Put more positively, there is substantial evidence that good minds in government, academe, journalism, and the business community in all parts of the world are turning, each in their own way, to the task of addressing and constructively answering the questions raised above. It is difficult to recall another period of history when so many thoughtful people concentrated their talents on the human condition from a worldwide perspective.

Third, the advent of networks and the flow of horizontal communications has brought many more people into one or another aspect of the ongoing dialogue. The conditions for the emergence of a series of global consensuses never existed quite to the extent that they do today. The skills of individuals and the orientations of the organizations they support are increasingly conducive to convergence around shared values.

None of this is to suggest, however, that nirvana lies ahead. Surely it does not. Surely fragmegration will be with us for a long time and surely many of its tensions will intensify. But the collective will to preserve and use the new, horizontal forms of authority is not lacking and that is not a trivial conclusion.

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32 For a discussion of how concerns about globalization are spreading on a global scale, see Rosenau, “The Globalization of Globalization”. 